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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
MERLENE LODDER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
WESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY and RICHARD WHITE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
7809 
Petition For Rehearing 
And Brief In Support Thereof 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The Western Pacific Railroad Company and Richard 
White, appellants herein, respectively petition this Honor-
able Court for a rehearing and reargument in the above 
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entitled case. The petition is based upon the following 
grounds: 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CON-
SIDER POINT IV AS ARGUED IN APPEL-
LANT'S BRIEF AND IN FAILING TO RE-
VERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT THEREON. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE 
EVIDENCE AND SPECIAL VERDICT SUF-
FICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD 
THAT THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
PLAINTIFF'S ACCIDENT AND INJURIES 
WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DRIVER. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CON- ,"~ 
SIDER POINTS V AND VI AS ARGUED IN 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF AND IN FAILING TO 
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT THEREON. 
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-\ WHEREFORE, the Appellants, petitioners herein, pray 
,... 
-· ,_ 
l.:.· 
...:... 
that the judgment and opinion of the court be reexamined 
and a reargument permitted of the entitled case. 
A brief in support of this petition is filed herewith. 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Grant H. Bagley, 
Leonard J. Lewis, 
Attorneys for Petitioners. 
GRANT H. BAGLEY, hereby certifies that he is one 
of the attorneys for Appellants, petitioners herein, and 
that in his opinion there is good cause to believe that the 
opinion is erroneous on the grounds set forth in the follow-
ing brief, and that the case ought to be reexamined and re-
argued as prayed for in said petition. 
DATED this, ____ .day of August, 1953. 
Grant H. Bagley 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
J Ordinarily appellants would not ask the court to re-
) consider a decision concurred in by all the members of the 
court. However, due to the importance of the questions in-
volved and an abiding conviction that the judgment of the 
trial court should not be affirmed, appellants urge the 
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4 
court to consider fully the questions and arguments which 
they make at this time. 4 
The decision of the court would seem to depart from 
the law in this field as established by the court in the 
course of its consideration of railroad grade crossing ac-
cidents. Furthermore, the appellants are disturbed that 
the court has not seen fit to recognize and discuss in its 
opinion several of the i~portant questions involved and 
that it has not condemned certain of the erroneous prac-
tices and rulings in the trial of the case. 
The brief which follows is submitted, not to rehash 
previous arguments, but to insure that no material issue 
has escaped the consideration of the court. This is a pur-
pose, we are sure, in which the court concurs. 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CON-
SIDER POINT IV AS ARGUED IN APPEL-
LANT'S BRIEF AND IN FAILING TO RE-
VERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
.COURT THEREON. 
The appellants vigorously contended in their brief 
and upon oral argument to the court that the trial court 
erred in refusing to submit the issue of plaintiff's contri-
butory negligence, and in refusing to instruct the jury on 
that issue as requested by defendants. (Appellants' Brief, 
pages 6, 7, 52.) In its opinion this court makes no men-
tion of that contention. At page 2 of the opinion, t:he court 
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5 
expressly excludes that issue as one of appellants' conten-
tions on this appeal. Appellants feel particularly justified 
therefor in asking the court at this time to give that issue 
the consideration which it merits. 
Throughout the course of this action, it was one of 
defendants' contentions that plaintiff was herself guilty of 
negligence proximately causing her accident and injury. 
This defense was alleged in defendants' answers ( R. 4, 6) . 
In their answer to plaintiff's interrogatories, defendants set 
forth the several specific respects in which it was claimed 
that plaintiff was negligent (R. 21). In their Requested 
Instruction No. 9, the defendants set forth the law applic-
able to the facts on this defense (R. 339). A reading of 
that requested instruction will show that defendants' con-
tention was not restricted to the claim that plaintiff's negli-
gence consisted merely of failure to maintain a lookout for 
the locomotive in question. It is extremely significant that 
the trial judge gave his tacit approval to the substance 
of said instruction by subscribing his name thereto and the 
words "given in substance." It is also significant that 
plaintiff herself recognized that the law and the evidence 
required the submission of the issue of her negligence to 
the jury under her Requested Instruction No. 1 (R. 341). 
Plaintiff asked that the whole question of her negligence be 
determined by the jury, not just the question of "lookout." 
Despite the defendants' pleadings and the requested in-
structions and the approval of said instructions by the trial 
court and plaintiff's counsel, the said defense was not sub-
mitted to the jury and no determination thereof was made 
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by the jury. The only inquiry made to the jury upon that 
issue was contained in Special Interrogatory No. 16: 
"Question No. 16: Do you find by a preponder-
anc of the evidence that plaintiff herself negligently 
failed to keep a lookout for the approach of the loco-
motive with which the car in which she was riding 
collided?" 
A critical consideration of the said interrogatory will 
readily reveal that it was insufficient. It utterly fails to 
·inquire whether plaintiff was negligent in failing to listen 
for or hear the bell on the locomotive. The importance of · 
this inquiry is manifest when one considers that the jury 
found that the bell was ringing continuously as the locomo-
tive approached the intersection. Said interrogatory does 
not even fully inquire as to plaintiff's duty to maintain a 
lookout; it is restricted to whether plaintiff maintained a 
lookout for the locomotive. It fails to inquire whether plain-
tiff was negligent in failing to maintain a lookout for the 
crossing watchman or a signal from him, or for the presence 
of other conditions or movements constituting forewarning 
of danger. Finally, the interrogatory utterly fails to in-
quire whether plaintiff was negligent in failing to warn 
or caution the driver concerning his speed or the conditions 
of the road or crossing. 
Under the law and the pleadings and the evidence, de-
fendants were entitled to have the jury determine the whole 
issue of plaintiff's negligence, not just the question whether 
the plaintiff was negligent in failing to maintain a lookout 
for the locomotive. This court has frequently held that the 
duty of an automobile passenger is to exercise that degree 
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of care which is customarily expected of a reasonable and 
prudent passenger under the circumstances. 
Hudson v. U. P. R. R. Co., . . . Utah ... , 233 
P. 2d 357; 
Montague v. S. L. & U. R. R. Co., ... Utah 
. , 17 4, Pac. 871 ; 
Cowan v. S. L. & U. R. R. Co., . . . Utah 
184 Pac. 599. 
., 
The duty of a passenger obviously includes more than 
simply maintaining a lookout for a specific approaching 
vehicle or object. It includes looking and listening and 
warning, and all other acts of a reasonable and prudent 
passenger under the circumstances. Surely neither the trial 
court nor this court could say that as a matter of law 
reasonable minds could not find that plaintiff was negli-
gent in failing to listen for or hear the bell on the locomo-
tive, or in failing to observe other warnings or signs of 
danger at the intersection, or in failing to caution or warn 
the driver of his speed or conditions of the road or the cross-
ing. These were questions which reasonable minds could 
differ upon, and questions, therefore, which should have 
been submitted to and determined by the jury. By her Re-
quested Instruction No. 1 the plaintiff herself conceded 
this. 
Appellants are unable to understand the statement 
made by the court in paragraph 1, page 2, of its opinion 
that the jury exonerated plaintiff and the driver of the 
automobile from any and all negligence, when in fact the 
jury was given no opportunity to ever pass upon the ques-
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tion of plaintiff's negligence except in answer to the in-
quiry contained in Interrogatory No. 16. It is clear, as 
argued in appellants' brief, page 45, that no findings in 
support of the judgment can be implied. Certainly no 
finding as to plaintiff's negligence could be inferred from 
the finding regarding the driver's negligence. Plaintiff 
could and might well. have been found guilty of negligence 
independent from any acts or omissions on the part of the 
driver. Only by the loosest and most uncritical type of 
thinking could a determination of the issue of plaintiff's 
negligence be sustained by reference to findings on the 
negligence of the driver. Moreover, the interrogatories did 
not fully submit the issue of the driver's negligence. No in-
quiry was made in them whether the driver was negligent 
in failing to listen for and hear the locomotive bell. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE 
EVIDENCE AND SPECIAL VERDICT SUF-
FICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT. 
The judgment must be sustained, if at all, on the basis 
of the interrogatories and the jury's answers thereto and 
the evidence. A consideration of the interrogatories relat-
ing to the issue of defendants' negligence and the evidence 
will show that the judgment cannot be sustained. The said 
interrogatories will be discussed in the order in which they 
were submitted. 
Interrogatory No.1: The jury answered this interroga-
tory in favor of defendants, and, therefore, no judgment 
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could be predicated upon the claim of negligence claimed 
in it. 
Interrogatory No. 3: The only inquiry made in this 
interrogatory and the only determination made by the jury 
thereon was whether the locomotive whistle was sounded 
just prior to the entrance of the locomotive into the inter-
section. Except for the negative testimony of plaintiff and 
her husband who said they did not hear the whistle, the 
uncontradicted evidence was that the whistle had been 
sounded at the second switch north of Second South, at the 
first switch north of Second South, and when the locomo-
tive was about one-half way between First and Second 
South Streets (R. 289) . The only independent significance 
which a failure to blow a whistle could have on this case 
would be by virtue of Section 77-0-14, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943. That statute requires, among other things, the blow-
ing of a whistle before each street crossing while passing 
through cities and towns. The statute does not even re-
motely suggest that the whistle be blown just prior to the 
entrance of the locomotive into an intersection. The rea-
sonable meaning of the statute is that the whistle be blown 
back from the crossing at a place where it can accomplish 
some good. It is apparent that a railroad neither discharges 
or fails to discharge its duty under that statute by blowing 
or failing to blow a whistle just prior to entering an inter-
section. At the very least, the interrogatory should have 
been in the language of the statute. Preferably it should 
have inquired whether the whistle was sounded at a place 
where it would reasonably give notice of the approaching 
locomotive. It was not submitted in that language, and the 
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jury's answer is not a finding that any duty imposed by 
the statute was violated. 
Moreover, there was no evidence to support a finding 
that the locomotive was passing through a city or town as 
provided in the statute. The uncontradicted evidence was 
that the, locomotive was proceeding from the roundhouse to 
the Union Depot. As the statute is penal in character, 
making the violation thereof a misdemeanor, it must be 
strictly construed and cannot be extended by implication. 
Gu,aranty Mtg. Co. v. Wilson, 62 Utah 184, 218 
Pac. 133; 
Millar v. Stuart, 69 Utah 250, 253 Pac. 900. 
The evidence was uncontradicted that both plaintiff 
and her husband were well aware of the presence of ·danger 
when the locomotive was some distance back from the 
north edge of the intersection. It is simply inconceivable 
that the sounding of the whistle iust prior to the entrance 
of the locomotive into the intersection would have prevented 
the accident. For that reason, it must be determined as a 
matter of law that the failure to blow the whistle iust prior 
to the entrance of the locomotive into the intersection was 
not a proximate cause of plaintiff's accident and injury. 
In view of the foregoing, Interrogatories Nos. 3 and 4, the 
evidence pertaining to them, are insufficient to sustain a 
judgment based thereon. 
Interrogatory No. 5: This interrogatory was answered 
in favor of defendants, and, therefore, no judgment could be 
based thereon. 
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· Interrogatory No. 7: What is the evidence from which 
it could be inferred that the engine crew failed to maintain 
a proper lookout? The uncontradicted evidence was that 
the engine crew were keeping a lookout in the direction the 
locomotive was moving (R. 190, 233, 245). These crew 
members saw everything that could be seen under the cir-
cumstances. The hostler helper had maintained a position 
on the rear end of the locomotive (R. 244). Before the rear 
of the locomotive reached the switch nearest Second South, 
the hostler helper had no view of automobiles approaching 
from the east (R. 243-5). The moment his vision cleared 
the building on the northeast corner of the intersection, 
the hostler helper saw the automobile in which plaintiff 
was riding. He realized that the automobile could not stop 
before reaching the tracks, and he immediately jumped off 
and gave the engineer an emergency stop signal (R. 233). 
The engineer responded immediately to the emergency 
signal (R. 235). There is not a single fragment of evidence 
in the record from which the jury could find that these 
crew members failed to maintain a lookout. It is difficult 
to understand how plaintiff could properly contend, or 
how a jury could properly find that the view of the crew 
members to the east was not obstructed by the building on 
the northeast corner of the intersection, making said crew 
members negligent, but that the. view of the driver of the 
automobile and the plaintiff was blocked by the presence 
of said building exonerating plaintiff and the driver from 
:$· negligence in that respect. The physical facts themselves, 
apart from the testimony of the crew members, conclusive-
ly demonstrate that the crew maintained that lookout which 
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was possible under the circumstances. They saw the auto-
mobile in which plaintiff was riding as soon as it was 
possible to do so. 
Interrogatory No. 11: This is the interrogatory which 
the court evidently believes best sustains the judgment. 
Apart from the conflicting evidence relating to this inter-
rogatory, the following considerations are important. What 
is the law upon which plaintiff relies to impose a duty 
upon defendants to maintain a flagman who shall signal 
motorists? What are the limitations of that duty? There is 
no statute in this jurisdiction imposing a duty upon a rail-
road to maintain a flagman at a crossing. Furthermore, 
this court has held that it is not negligence for a railroad 
to fail to keep a flagman at a public crossing. 
Christensen v. 0. S. L. R. R. Co., 80 Pac. 746. 
That decision is in accord with the great weight of 
authority. See the collection of cases cited for this proposi-
tion in the annotation in 60 A. L. R. at 1196. Not owing 
plaintiff any duty to maintain a flagman at said crossing, 
it would not be negligence for the flagman to fail to sta-
tion himself in the intersection and wave plaintiff's hus-
band down. The court seems influenced by the testimony 
that the watchman was talking on the telephone a short 
time prior to the accident. The transcript reveals, how-
ever, that the said telephone conversation was in the per-
formance of the watchman's duties. It was a call to the 
yardmaster for the purpose of determining the movement 
of trains. The evidence demonstrates the watchman's duties 
consisted of more than simply flagging the crossing. It 
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was his duty to aid in the lining of switches and the signal-
ing of trains and equipment entering the depot. Certainly, 
these duties could be performed without subjecting the 
railroad to liability for failure to have said watchman sta-
tioned in the intersection at all times. As argued by appel-
lants in their brief, and as stated by this court in the 
Christensen case cited above, the question to be submitted 
to the jury, if any, was whether the defendants had given 
reasonable warning of the approach of the locomotive; 
negligence could not be predicated solely upon failure to 
have a flagman in the intersection or failure to give special 
warning of some other type. Failure to have a flagman at 
the crossing was only one possible factor to be considered 
in determining whether the railroad was negligent in fail-
ing to give reasonable warning of the approach of the loco-
motive. It could not be the basis of negligence in and of 
itself. 
Interrogatory No. 11 is insufficient to sustain a judg-
ment for other reasons. A reading of said interrogatory 
clearly demonstrates that it is duplicitous and ambiguous. 
The said interrogatory contains two distinct propositions 
stated in the disjunctive or alternative: "Do you find that 
the watchman or flagman negligently failed to be stationed 
in the intersection or that he negligently failed to signal 
the plaintiff or the driver?" The answer to this interroga-
tor was "yes," but what meaning does that answer have? 
It means simply that eight jurors agreed that the watchman 
·::~ either failed to do one thing or do another. It is not a 
"" finding by six of the jurors or more that the watchman 
failed to station himself in the intersection and it is not 
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a finding by six of the jurors or more that the watchman 
failed to signal the plaintiff or the driver. Four jurors 
might have been of .the opinion that the watchman failed to 
be stationed in the intersection; four might have been of 
the opinion that the watchman failed to signal; or three 
might have agreed to one proposition and five to the other 
proposition. No one can say, however, whether six of the 
jurors agreed upon any one of the alternative propositions. 
The judgment should not be permitted to stand on the 
basis of such an interrogatory. 
The general rule is that each special interrogatory 
must call for a finding on a single question of fact; an in-
terrogatory combining two or more issues in one question 
in the disjunctive or alternative is patently bad. 
Gunther v. Ulbrich, 52 N. W. 88; 
Martin v. Elbert, 13 N. W. 2d 907; 
Butter v; Herring, 34 S. W. 2d 307; 
McFadden v. Hebert, 15 S. W. 2d 213; 
Friedman v. New York R. Co., 71 Atl. 901; 
Illinois Steel Co. v. Mann, 64 N. E. 484; 
Jones v. Shelby County, 100 N. W. 520; 
Webb v. Boulanger, 229 Pac. 754. 
The foregoing principle is so well settled and the 
reasons for it so apparent that it would seem to require no 
further explanation. Although argued by appellants at 
page 41 of their brief, the court makes no mention of the 
problem. It is appellants' belief that upon further reflec-
tion it will be apparent to the court that the interrogatory 
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< was improper, and that the answer to it has no effect what-
so ever. Certainly, the court should not permit or condone 
the practice of submitting this type of interrogatory to a 
t: jury. 
. .'··; 
The interrogatories which have been discussed above 
are the only ones relating to the issues of defendants' negli-
gence. The judgment must be sustained, if at all, on the 
basis of said interrogatories. As argued above, there is not 
one of those interrogatories upon which a judgment in this 
case could be sustained. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD 
THAT THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
PLAINTIFF'S ACCIDENT AND INJURIES 
WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DRIVER. 
In its disposition of the above stated contention, the 
court states that the driver's negligence was an issue for 
the jury; that the jury's conclusion cannot be overruled. 
Appellants submit that the evidence and law requires 
a finding that the driver was negligent and his negligence 
the sole proximate cause. The transcript will show that 
the driver apparently assumed that because he saw and 
heard no warning of the approach of a locomotive or train 
that he could safely proceed into the intersection without 
stopping. That is exactly what the driver intended to 
and did do despite the fact that he admittedly could not see 
to the north of the intersection because of the building 
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on the northeast corner thereof. The driver could certainly 
not reasonably indulge in such an assumption. He was ap-
proaching what he knew to be an intersection; he knew 
that he could not see traffic, if any, approaching the inter-
section from the north. Fourth West Street was and is a 
street travelled by conveyances of all types-trains, auto-
mobiles and trucks, the driver was confronted with the 
likelihood of any one of such conveyances moving into the 
intersection from the north. The result of his conduct would 
likely have been no different had the south bound con-
veyance been an automobile instead of the locomotive. The 
exercise of reasonable care reasonably required that the 
driver maintain a speed which would permit him to stop in 
time to avoid colliding with traffic moving south through 
said intersection. This he did not do. For the driver to 
assume that because he saw no signal and heard no signal 
of the approach of a locomotive or train, that he could enter 
and pass through the intersection without stopping was 
without doubt the grossest form of negligence. The statute, 
Section 57-7-113 (a) U. C. A. 1943, (41-6-46 (a) U. C. A. 
1953), provides: 
"In every event speed shall be so controlled as 
may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, 
vehicle or other conveyance on or entering the high-
way * * * " 
The driver did precisely what the statute forbids. His 
speed, whatever it was, prevented him from avoiding a 
collision with other conveyances entering the intersection. 
For these reasons it is apparent that the driver was negli-
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gent as a matter of law. The court should not condone such 
conduct. 
Moreover, the physical facts and common experience 
belie the testimony of the plaintiff and the driver as to the 
speed of the automobile. The only independent witness on 
this question was S. S. Taylor, a civil engineer and an 
expert on stopping distances ( R. 297, 298) . It was his 
opinion, based on the undisputed physical facts that the 
automobile was travelling at a speed of 25 to 30 miles an 
hour when it started to slide ( R. 300) . Any experienced 
driver will at once conclude that an automobile travelling 
at the speed of 15m. p. h. can be stopped, even on a slippery 
road, in a distance of 60 feet. These considerations simply 
make the testimony of plaintiff and the driver unworthy 
of belief by this court. 
The court while recognizing the principal stated therein 
distinguishes the several cases cited by appellants in sup-
port of this contention on the grounds that they are not 
cases involving failure to have a watchman. Appellants 
respectfully submit that the principal stated in those cases 
applies irrespective of whether the claimed negligence is 
failure to give notice by means of a whistle or failure to 
give notice by means of a watchman. Those cases assume 
negligence on the part of the railroad in failure to give 
notice of the approach of a train. Moreover, in at least one 
of those cases the plaintiff alleged and attempted to prove 
that the railroad was negligent in not maintaining a watch-
':'2-~: man at the crossing. 
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Umlauft v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry Co., 233 
Wis. 291, 289 N. W. 623. 
The important consideration is that in the cases cited 
by appellants, as in this case, there was simply no proof 
that an earlier warning of some kind by the Railroad would 
have prevented prevented the accident; in those cases as 
in this, that question was entirely speculative and con-
jectural. The court states at Page 4 o{ its opinion that there 
is no suggestion in the ·evidence that had the watchman 
signaled the traffic the driver would not have stopped 
sooner. This statement would seem to suggest that defend-
ant, rather than plaintiff, has the burden of proof. It was 
incumbent upon plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that an earlier warning would have prevented 
the accident, not for defendant to disprove that. A finding 
in favor of plaintiff on that question must be based on 
competent evidence, not on conjecture as to what a driver 
would or might do. The undisputed fact is that the driver 
knew from the time he entered Second South, a block away, 
that he would be approaching the intersection and the rail-
road crossing. He knew the exact location of the tracks and 
he knew that engines and trains passed over the crossing 
at all hours of the day and night. He had notice of the 
danger at that time and did not protect his safety or that 
of plaintiff; at that time and for several hundred feet, the 
driver could have acted to prevent the accident. Under 
those circumstances his negligence was the sole cause of the 
accident and plaintiff's injuries as a matter of law. 
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POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CON-
SIDER POINTS V AND VI AS ARGUED IN 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF AND IN FAILING TO 
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT THEREON. 
Appellants points V and VI, argued in their brief, 
were not mentioned by the court in its summary of appel-
lants' contentions and were not discussed in the opinion. 
Appellants still believe that those contentions are material 
and important as demonstrated by the cited cases and must 
be reckoned with in order to sustain the judgment. 
Point V in appellants' brief related to the abstract 
definition of the term "proximate cause" given by the trial 
court to the jury. The issue of proximate cause was of 
vital importance to defendants in this case. It was import-
ant that the jury be given an instruction on proximate 
cause applied to the evidence which was clear and unam-
biguous. It is appellants' position that instruction No. 2 
given by the trial court to the jury could only result in 
confusing the jury on this vital issue. It seems doubtful 
to appellants whether the said instruction could be under-
stood by a person legally trained let alone a layman. The 
said instruction contains technical legal language which 
could not be fully understood by the average juror. By way 
of illustration, what does the word "efficient" mean to a 
layman? Is there anything in the instruction explaining 
the meaning of that word? What does the word intervening 
mean to a layman? Is there anything in the instruction or 
elsewhere defining that word? It seems highly significant 
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to appellants that even the modern legal treatises on this 
subject, written for the benefit of legally trained persons, 
define causation in terms more easily understood than the 
terms employed in instruction No. 2. In the American Law 
Institute, Restatement Of The Law of Torts, Volume 2, 
Section 431 legal cause is defined as: The actor's negligent 
conduct is a cause of harm to the other if (a) his conduct 
is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm and (b) 
there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability 
because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted 
in the harm. The use of the term "substantial factor" has 
a definite and unambiguous meaning to both a lawyer and 
a layman. The language contained in instruction No. 2 
has no meaning whatsoever; said language could only 
confuse a jury. Although the trial court apparently be-
lieved that the jury would readily understand the meaning 
of the term "intervening" the restatement of the law of 
torts written for the benefit of legally trained persons, goes 
to some length to define the meaning of that term. In sec-
tion 441 of the said restatement intervening force is defined 
as "(1) an intervening force is one that actively operates 
in producing harm to another after the actor's negligent act 
or omission has been committed." The said section further 
discusses the distinction between dependent and independ-
ent intervening forces. It would seem apparent the jury 
could not reasonably be expected to understand the mean-
ing of instruction No. 2 or the language contained therein. 
As argued by appellants in their brief, the situation was 
not aided by any instruction applying the principle to the 
facts of the case. The instruction simply stated an abstract 
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proposition of law in an ambiguous and misleading manner. 
Inasmuch as the question of proximate cause was a vital 
one to appellants' defense, the giving of said instruction 
clearly prejudiced appellants. Appellants submit therefore, 
that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed 
on that ground. 
Appellants argued in Point VI of their brief that 
Special Interrogatories Nos. 13 and 14 should not have 
been submitted to the jury because said interrogatories per-
tained to issues which should have been determined as a 
matter of law. Those interrogatories related to the negli-
gence of the driver of the automobile. The argument made 
in this brief under point 4 will demonstrate that the negli-
gence of the driver should have been determined as a 
matter of law. 
Appellants also contended in Point VI of their brief 
that special interrogatories Nos. 7 and 8 should not have 
been submitted to the jury. Said interrogatories related to 
whether the operators of the locomotive failed to keep a 
lookout for automobiles crossing the intersection. As we 
have already demonstrated in this brief, there is no evi-
dence from which a jury could find that the said operators 
failed to keep a lookout for automobiles crossing the inter-
section. No jury question was presented upon that claim of 
negligence. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully submit that 
the Court should grant appellants' petition for rehearing. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Grant H. Bagley, 
Leonard· J. Lewis, 
Attorneys for Petitioners. 
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